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One who would defend [certain constitutional rights] must share his foxhole 
with scoundrels of every sort, but to abandon the post because of the poor 
company is to sell freedom cheaply.1 
I.  Introduction 
My initial reaction to Brett Shockley’s Note, Protecting Due Process from 
the PROTECT Act:  The Problems with Increasing Periods of Supervised 
Release for Sexual Offenders,2 was to admire his courage.  Not many people 
would undertake a discussion of possible injustice to child pornographers, who 
surely rank with terrorists and drug dealers as the most reviled and least 
sympathetic claimants for fair treatment.  Shockley puts aside the moral 
condemnation these people deserve,3 and focuses on the morality of 
procedure—the rule of law if you will—divorced from the worthiness, or lack 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. 
 1. Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379–80 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 2. Brett M. Shockley, Protecting Due Process from the PROTECT Act:  The Problems 
with Increasing Periods of Supervised Release for Sexual Offenders, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
353 (2010). 
 3. See id. at 388 (acknowledging that sex offenders deserve punishment). 
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thereof, of particular defendants.  As students of criminal procedure come to 
learn, our most precious rights are sometimes invoked and defended by our 
worst citizens.4  In the final tally, constitutional protections often flow from the 
intrinsic worth of proper procedure, aside from the worth of the people who ask 
for that procedure. 
The other display of courage that gained my admiration was the 
willingness of a second-year law student to tackle two complex constitutional 
doctrines,5 further complicated by seemingly inconsistent congressional 
enactments.  When I grasped the full scope of Shockley’s analysis, I mused as 
to why he had not tackled something easier like the abortion controversy or the 
full ramifications of death penalty law.  If this "first edition" article by a young 
scholar is a predictor of the future, I can hardly wait for the sequel. 
II.  The Constitutionality of Current Law 
Shockley attempts to hook the government on the horns of a dilemma 
created by two constitutional doctrines:  the double jeopardy provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment,6 and the Due Process Clause as expounded in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey.7  At its most fundamental level, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibits multiple trials and multiple punishments for a single crime.  When a 
convicted sex offender commits a second sexual offense, the simplest way to 
avoid double jeopardy problems is to say that the offender will be punished 
separately for two distinct crimes.  Separate crimes and punishments could be 
the following:  (1) the first offense warrants ten years imprisonment with the 
accompanying lifetime supervised release; and (2) the second offense warrants 
revocation of that supervised release and reincarceration for life.8 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
("It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged 
in controversies involving not very nice people."). 
 5. The Supreme Court referred to one of those doctrines—the prohibition against double 
jeopardy—as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid 
judicial navigator."  Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."). 
 7. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 8. An actual conviction for a second offense would warrant a sentence of twenty years, 
but it is unlikely a prosecutor would seek such a conviction when revocation offers the option of 
lifetime incarceration.  The benefit of obtaining an actual conviction, however, is the 
elimination of Apprendi problems because there would be no factual findings to be made at a 
revocation hearing.  The government may "elect to rely solely upon a criminal conviction, 
without evidence of the related conduct, to establish the reasonable cause necessary to 
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This is a straightforward way to avoid double jeopardy problems, but in 
turn, this approach creates an Apprendi problem.  If life imprisonment through 
revocation of supervised release is a separate and distinct punishment for a 
second crime, the defendant has been punished for that crime without according 
him a trial with full due process rights.  In place of a full trial, the determination 
of whether or not the defendant committed a second sexual offense would be 
made in a revocation hearing without a jury and without holding the 
government to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
Some courts have avoided the Apprendi problem by holding that life 
imprisonment through revocation is not a second punishment, but is part of the 
original sentence for the first offense—an offense that was litigated at a trial 
where the defendant was accorded the full panoply of his due process rights.9  
But the price for solving the Apprendi problem in this manner is a resurrection 
of the double jeopardy problem.  If the initial conviction justified both the 
original imprisonment for ten years and the potential for life imprisonment 
following revocation, has the defendant not been sentenced to two terms of 
incarceration?  Shockley has no qualms about asserting that "supervised release 
defendants are subject to two punishments for one offense.  This is in clear 
contradiction of the Court’s mandate that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
‘protection applies both to successive punishments and to successive 
prosecutions for the same criminal offense.’"10 
However, it is not as "clear" to me as it is to Shockley that there has been a 
violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.  There are instances when 
a single conviction may warrant multiple forms of punishment.  For example, it 
is not a violation of double jeopardy when a court imposes both incarceration 
and a fine for one conviction.  Not only is this not a violation of double 
jeopardy, but this familiar form of multiple punishment does not violate 
                                                                                                                 
revocation, the ‘bare fact’ of such conviction clearly becomes the basis for the revocation 
order."  Resio v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 892, 895 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).  This, however, is a 
one-way street in the government’s favor.  An acquittal of the second offense does not bar 
subsequent revocation.  See, e.g., Marshall v. Commonwealth, 116 S.E.2d 270, 274 (Va. 1960) 
(concluding that defendant’s conduct, as proved in the trial in which a jury acquitted the 
defendant, may be used to support a revocation).  At least in theory, the judge at the revocation 
hearing could make factual findings contrary to the prior findings of a jury that acquitted the 
defendant of the second offense.  This would seem to create an Apprendi problem taken to the 
nth power. 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing a 
sentence as having "distinct aspects," including "the incarcerative term imposed for the crime of 
conviction . . . and the supervised release term applicable thereto"); Shockley, supra note 2, at 
373–75 (discussing a number of similar holdings). 
 10. Shockley, supra note 2, at 382 (emphasis added and omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)). 
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Apprendi even though the necessity to pay the fine may hinge on resolution of 
additional future facts.  For example, the government may collect fines only if 
the defendant is financially able to pay—debtors’ prison is a thing of the past.  
Whether a defendant is incapable of paying the fines or simply refusing to 
pay—in which case the defendant may be punished once again for contempt of 
court—is a factual determination that will be made sometime after the initial 
conviction, and at a hearing where the defendant will not be accorded his full 
due process trial rights.  At least to date, I am unaware of any successful double 
jeopardy or Apprendi challenges to this traditional coupling of incarceration 
and fines for a single offense. 
Of course, imprisonment and a financial fine involve two distinct forms of 
punishment, whereas a court seems to double-up on a single form of 
punishment when it imposes both a ten-year sentence for the initial conviction 
and a life sentence if and when supervised release is subsequently revoked.  But 
even in this situation, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not contain a per se 
prohibition of all multiple punishments.  The prohibition against multiple 
punishments is merely a rule of statutory construction, and the Supreme Court 
has explained that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally 
permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the 
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."11  Missouri v. Hunter12 
subsequently cautioned that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require courts 
to negate clearly expressed legislative intent to impose multiple punishments.13 
Thus, with respect to sentencing, double jeopardy analysis turns on 
whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to impose multiple punishments 
on repeat sex offenders.  The operative word here is "clearly."  I have 
questioned whether Shockley clearly demonstrated a violation of double 
jeopardy, but I also question whether Congress clearly has placed its 
punishment scheme beyond the coverage of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Looking only at the statutory language itself, Congress seems to have 
expressed conflicting intents.  A maximum punishment of ten years for a first 
offense and twenty years for a second offense seems to express the 
congressional view of the appropriate levels of punishment for repeat offenders. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Albernaz v. U.S., 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). 
 12. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). 
 13. Id. at 366 ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended.").  The only constitutional limitation on the 
legislature’s clear intent to inflict excessive punishment is the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." (emphasis added)). 
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But the PROTECT Act14 authorizes, and the Sentencing Guidelines 
encourage,15 supervised release for life, thus subjecting repeat offenders to life 
imprisonment when that release is revoked. 
At least on the surface, these congressional enactments lack the clarity of a 
unifying intent, and in fact appear contradictory.  But I have not researched the 
legislative history of these statutes.  Those who wish to pursue this issue must 
take up the task of examining legislative history and either refuting or 
substantiating Shockley’s claim that "by allowing a steeper punishment for a 
second offense via the revocation process than that intended by Congress, the 
system undermines legislative intent."16 
III.  The Wisdom of Current Policy 
While the constitutionality of the current laws remains in doubt, there is 
less doubt surrounding Shockley’s attack on the wisdom of what Congress and 
the courts have wrought.  Putting aside constitutional considerations, he 
proposes three possible improvements to the current system. 
A.  Solution 1 
The current approach relies on both a carrot and a stick.  The carrot is that 
sexual offenders often suffer from psychological disorders not easily cured, 
therefore lengthy periods of supervised release offer a better chance for 
rehabilitation and a successful transition from prison to liberty.  The stick is the 
threat of reincarceration for life when the terms of supervised release are 
violated by a second sexual offense.  Solution 1 concludes that the punishment 
stick is too severe.  Shockley proposes that life imprisonment be replaced by a 
maximum punishment of twenty-five years for repeat offenders:  twenty years 
upon conviction of a second sexual offense and five years upon revocation of 
supervised release previously imposed for the first sexual offense.17 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.2(b) (2009) ("If the instant offense of 
conviction is a sex offense . . . the statutory maximum term of supervised release is 
recommended." (emphasis added)). 
 16. Shockley, supra note 2, at 384. 
 17. Id. at 389–90. 
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He concedes that this solution solves none of the double jeopardy or 
Apprendi problems, but at least violations of the defendants’ constitutional 
rights would be mitigated by a lesser term of imprisonment.  The downside to 
this pragmatic solution is that the government appears to be saying that it may 
continue to violate constitutional doctrines so long as it reduces the actual 
incarceration time of those whose rights have been violated.  The other 
downside is that a solution whose essence is a plea to lessen punishment of 
repeat sex offenders is unlikely to generate much public or political support.18 
B.  Solution 2 
Solution 2 advocates discarding the supervised release regime and 
returning to a parole scheme in the federal criminal justice system.19  The main 
difference from the current system would be structural.  "Whereas supervised 
release ‘tacks on’ a supervision period to be served once the full sentence has 
been completed, the parole system ‘carves out’ a period of supervision from the 
length of the original sentence."20 
As the Fifth Circuit noted, this approach might pass constitutional muster 
because "probation is imposed instead of imprisonment, while supervised 
release is imposed after imprisonment."21  In other words, only supervised 
release, not parole, adds a second punishment beyond the statutory maximum 
punishment for an offense.  Solution 2, however, may unduly exalt form over 
substance because, regardless of whether the repeat offender faces revocation of 
parole or revocation of supervised release, he may wind up with very 
substantial periods of incarceration.  In fact, Solution 2 transfers a large portion 
of a defendant’s sentence from supervised release (with a threat of revocation) 
to additional incarceration before the defendant becomes eligible for parole.  
Increasing the time of initial incarceration heightens the monitoring of the 
offender, but it weakens the prime goal of supervised release—to aid offenders 
in their transition from prison to liberty.  Shockley himself concedes that "a 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Characterizing Solution 1 as a plea for mercy on sex offenders may be a cheap 
political shot on my part.  Solution 1 does offer a compromise reconciliation of both 
congressional intents:  monitoring and oversight to promote successful rehabilitation, coupled 
with strong punitive measures for repeat offenders. 
 19. Federal supervised release replaced the federal parole system in 1987.  See Gozlon-
Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991) (noting the changes implemented by the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.)). 
 20. Shockley, supra note 2, at 392. 
 21. United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 427 n.13 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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constitutional but ineffective scheme [Solution 2] is little better than an 
unconstitutional scheme [Solution 1]."22 
C.  Solution 3 
Solution 3 attempts to solve both the constitutional and policy problems 
surrounding supervised release.  "Under this approach, defendants would be 
entitled to the same due process protections—specifically the reasonable doubt 
standard and right to a jury trial—at revocation hearings as they are at full-
blown prosecutions."23  Such an approach eliminates double jeopardy problems 
because revocation and reincarceration could be characterized as a second 
punishment for a second offense, not a doubling-up of the punishment for the 
initial crime.  In turn, Apprendi issues are resolved by according defendants 
their full trial rights when determining whether they have committed a second 
offense. 
The only downside to Solution 3 is the scope of its effect on the criminal 
justice system.  Make no mistake, this is not a narrow correction for the 
constitutional and policy problems created by the current supervised release 
program.  The fundamental premise of Solution 3 is that no one should be 
reincarcerated without affording them the same rights applicable at a full scale 
prosecution.  This proposal thus constitutes a broadside attack upon all 
revocation hearings, whether the issue is revocation of supervised release, 
parole, probation, or suspended sentence.  Such hearings traditionally have had 
a "due process light" approach.  Under this approach, the defendant is entitled 
to some procedural protections, but is denied the right to trial by jury and the 
right to require the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The criminal justice system would be fundamentally altered if defendants were 
accorded full trial rights at all post-sentencing hearings that might revoke their 
liberty and send them back to prison. 
Such a fundamental change might well be a significant improvement, but 
the scope of this new and improved punishment system requires consideration 
of factors far beyond what Shockley has focused on in his Note.  As one of 
Shockley’s former professors, I can suggest (but no longer assign) that his next 
project be to extend his consideration of revocation hearings to cover all forms 
of post-sentence hearings where defendants face a loss of liberty. 
None of Shockley’s proposed solutions is perfect, but this does not lessen 
the impact of his attack upon the current system.  His primary contribution has 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Shockley, supra note 2, at 393. 
 23. Id. at 394. 
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been to force Congress and the courts to reconsider the weaknesses and the 
inconsistencies of the current supervised release regime.  Hopefully, Congress 
and the judiciary will utilize his analysis when formulating improvements to the 
current system. 
